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SENTENCING FACTORS AND INTENT:  
THE ROLE OF MENS REA IN A FEDERAL GUN STATUTE 
Michael J. Naporano∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Bob walks into a bank, raises his loaded 9mm Berretta pistol, and 
demands cash.  As Bob scoops up money from the counter, he mis-
handles his weapon and accidentally fires a round into the ceiling, in-
juring no one.  Depending on where in the United States this inci-
dent occurs, Bob may have just added three additional years to his 
prison sentence for discharging his firearm. 
Section 924(c)(1)(A) of the Gun Control Act of 19681 is a fed-
eral gun control statute, which imposes mandatory minimum prison 
sentences on those who commit certain crimes with firearms.  The 
statute begins by listing the elements of a complete crime in the fol-
lowing principle paragraph: 
 ∗ J.D., 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2001, Bucknell Univer-
sity.  The author would like to thank Professor John Wefing for reviewing numerous 
drafts and providing valuable insight. 
 1 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000).  Setting out the relevant portions of the stat-
ute in full: 
Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise 
provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person 
who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking 
crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that 
provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a 
deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be 
prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or 
who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in ad-
dition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug 
trafficking crime— 
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 
years; 
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of im-
prisonment of not less than 7 years; and 
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of im-
prisonment of not less than 10 years. 
Id. 
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[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence 
or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in 
furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addi-
tion to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or 
drug trafficking crime— 
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 
5 years.2
To receive the five-year mandatory sentence under this para-
graph, a defendant must be indicted under this section and either 
plead guilty or be found guilty by a jury.3  The statute contains two 
further provisions, however, which increase the mandatory minimum 
sentences depending on the existence of two additional factors.4  The 
statute increases the minimum sentence to seven years “if the firearm 
is brandished,”5 and to ten years “if the firearm is discharged.”6
In 2002, the Supreme Court in Harris v. United States7 ruled that 
these brandishing and discharge provisions were sentencing factors 
and not separate offenses.8  Thus, the sentencing judge must impose 
an increased sentence of seven or ten years even though “[t]hat fac-
tor need not be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”9  To increase a defendant’s sen-
tence from five years to seven or ten years requires only a judicial 
finding of the existence of certain facts by a preponderance of the 
evidence.10  This Comment explores whether a judge, while sentenc-
ing a defendant under § 924(c)’s discharge provision, is required to 
find that the defendant intended to discharge the firearm.  In the ex-
ample given above, Bob accidentally discharged the firearm into the 
ceiling.  In the D.C. and Ninth Circuits, Bob would not receive the 
increased sentence because he lacked the intent to discharge the fire-
arm.11  However, in the Tenth and Sixth Circuits, Bob is strictly liable 
 2 Id. § 924(c)(1)(A). 
 3 See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 551–52 (2002). 
 4 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii–iii). 
 5 Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
 6 Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
 7 536 U.S. 545. 
 8 Id. at 556. 
 9 Id. at 568. 
 10 See id. at 568–69. 
 11 See United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 154 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Dare, 425 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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for the discharge and must serve the minimum ten-year prison sen-
tence.12
Before discussing the circuit split regarding whether the dis-
charge provision requires intent, the following issue must be clarified: 
how can a judge increase a defendant’s sentence based on facts not 
alleged in the indictment nor found by a jury without offending the 
constitutional requirements declared by the Supreme Court in Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey13 and subsequent cases?  Under Apprendi, “any fact  
. . . that increases the penalty for a crime must be charged in an in-
dictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”14  The answer lies in § 924(c)’s unstated statutory maximum 
of life imprisonment.15  A jury conviction under § 924(c)’s underlying 
offense of using or carrying a firearm during the commission of a 
crime, even without finding that the defendant brandished or dis-
charged the firearm, would subject the defendant to a potential sen-
tence range from five years to life in prison.16  In fact, the plurality in 
Harris, cognizant of Apprendi’s holding, distinguished § 924(c) from 
the statute at issue in Apprendi, noting that § 924(c) contains no pre-
scribed statutory maximum, thus, “the judge may impose a sentence 
well in excess of seven years, whether or not the defendant bran-
dished [or discharged] the firearm.”17
Yet, as this Comment discusses, doubt as to Harris’s viability lin-
gers due to shifting dynamics within the Supreme Court, and discor-
dant rulings and dicta in later Supreme Court sentencing opinions.18  
The Court has been expanding Sixth Amendment protections by lim-
iting a judge’s ability to increase penalties during the sentencing 
phase.19  If Harris were to be overruled, § 924(c)’s brandishing and 
discharge provisions would no longer be sentencing factors to be 
found by a judge, but criminal elements with full procedural protec-
tions of a jury trial.20  If so, mens rea could not be averted so easily, 
 12 See United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2003); United States 
v. Tunstall, 49 Fed. Appx. 581 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 13 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 14 Id. at 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)). 
 15 United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 811 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 16 Id.; Dare, 425 F.3d at 640; United States v. Sandoval, 241 F.3d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 
2001); see also Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 554 (2002). 
 17 Harris, 536 U.S. at 554. 
 18 United States v. Malouf, 377 F. Supp. 2d 315, 327 (D. Mass. 2005). 
 19 See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007); United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi, 530 U.S. 
466. 
 20 See Harris, 536 U.S. at 560 (distinguishing between offense elements and sen-
tencing factors). 
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and the courts that currently impose strict liability on § 924(c)’s dis-
charge provision would find little justification for doing so.  But Har-
ris has not yet been overruled.21  Thus, this Comment must proceed 
under the assumed viability of Harris’s ruling that § 924(c)’s dis-
charge provision is a sentencing factor and not a separate element to 
be found by a jury. 
The circuit courts that have split regarding § 924(c)’s mens rea 
requirement have not only differed in their conclusions but also in 
their analytical methods.22  One side uses traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation, which includes an analysis of the text, structure, and 
history of the statute backstopped by the doctrines of lenity and the 
presumption against strict liability.23  These courts conclude that the 
statute is ambiguous but that Congress intended for the discharge 
provision to require mens rea.24  Yet the fact that Harris ruled that the 
discharge provision is a sentencing factor has created an alternative 
analysis because sentencing factors generally do not afford the same 
procedural rights to defendants as regular offense elements.25  The 
question then becomes whether a judge can automatically dismiss the 
mens rea requirement for a sentencing factor simply because it is a 
sentencing factor.  This characterizes the position taken by the cir-
cuits which have concluded that § 924(c)’s discharge provision does 
not require criminal intent.26  These courts rely heavily on Harris, and 
seem to create a rule that judges need not determine a defendant’s 
mental culpability when finding facts that are sentencing enhance-
ments and not elements of a crime.27
The fact that a judge can theoretically sentence a defendant up 
to life in prison under § 924(c)’s underlying offense would threaten 
to make any debate over the discharge provision’s intent requirement 
either irrelevant or completely academic if not for the actual practice 
in federal courts today.  For instance, judges who sentence defen-
dants under § 924(c) rarely, if ever, deviate from the applicable min-
imum sentence.28  Thus, a defendant who is sentenced under the dis-
 21 United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 575 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 22 Compare United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2003), with 
United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 154 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 23 E.g., Brown, 449 F.3d 154. 
 24 E.g., id. at 158. 
 25 See Harris, 536 U.S. at 560. 
 26 E.g., Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d at 1206. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Harris, 536 U.S. at 578 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
The suggestion that a 7-year sentence could be imposed even without a 
finding that a defendant brandished a firearm ignores the fact that the 
NAPORANO (FINAL) 12/1/2008  12:45:32 PM 
2008] COMMENT 1571 
 
charge provision will almost always receive a sentence of exactly ten 
years, but if found not to have discharged a firearm, would usually 
serve only seven years for brandishing, or even five years if the defen-
dant neither brandished nor discharged the firearm.29  The stakes are 
raised by § 924(c)’s imposition of mandatory sentences, which not 
only preclude judges from departing downward to compensate for 
individualized circumstances,30 but also run consecutively with any 
other sentence.31  Finally, a judicial finding that the defendant dis-
charged a firearm condemns him to at least three additional years in 
federal prison without the possibility of parole.32
Parts II and III of this Comment explore the statute’s legislative 
history and discuss the Supreme Court’s increasingly fragile decision 
in Harris.33  Part IV discusses the divergent rulings among circuit 
courts and explores the different methods these courts have used to 
analyze whether the discharge provision of § 924(c) requires intent.34  
Part V discusses the rule created in the Tenth Circuit that sentencing 
factors do not require a finding of mens rea, and demonstrates that 
such a rule is unworkable and inaccurate.35  Part VI discusses the 
standard tools that federal courts use in interpreting a statute to de-
termine whether it requires a finding of mens rea, and also argues 
that the discharge provision is ambiguous regarding mens rea.36  Fi-
nally, this Comment concludes that courts should require that the de-
fendant intended to discharge a firearm under § 924(c)’s discharge 
provision. 
sentence imposed when a defendant is found only to have “carried” a 
firearm “in relation to” a drug trafficking offense appears to be, almost 
uniformly, if not invariably, five years.  Similarly, those found to have 
brandished a firearm typically, if not always, are sentenced only to 7 
years in prison while those found to have discharged a firearm are sen-
tenced only to 10 years. 
Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i–iii) (2006) (defining the terms of imprisonment as 
“not less than” five, seven, or ten years). 
 31 Id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). 
 32 See id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(i). 
 33 See infra notes 37–97 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 98–180 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 181–203 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 202–43 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE HISTORY OF 18 U.S.C. § 924(C) AND ITS 
 DISCHARGE PROVISION 
The present form of § 924(c)(1)(A) is rooted in the Gun Con-
trol Act of 196837 and is the product of multiple amendments 
throughout the years.38  The original statute imposed a mandatory 
minimum sentence of at least one year on offenders who “use” or 
“carry” a firearm during the commission of any federal felony.39  
However, the statute’s effect was weakened because it allowed parole 
and sentencing judges could suspend the sentence; furthermore, Su-
preme Court cases interpreted the provision as a cumulative en-
hancement instead of a separate offense.40  Because of these ways to 
get around the penalty, Congress amended § 924(c) with the Com-
prehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,41 which reduced potential 
variations in sentences.  Specifically, the amendment ensured that an 
offender who used a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of 
 37 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
(c)Whoever— 
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony which may be prose-
cuted in a court of the United States, or 
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any fe-
lony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, 
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year 
nor more than 10 years. 
Id. 
 38 Thomas A. Clare, Smith v. United States and the Modern Interpretation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c): A Proposal to Amend the Federal Armed Offender Statute, 69 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 815, 823–26 (1994). 
 39 Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213. 
 40 Clare, supra note 38, at 823. 
 41 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 
(1984) (codified as amended in various sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).  The 
Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to read as follows: 
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . uses or 
carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime of 
violence, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years. . . .  Notwith-
standing any other provision of law, the court shall not place on proba-
tion or suspend the sentence of any person convicted of a violation of 
this subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this 
subsection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment, in-
cluding that imposed for the crime of violence in which the firearm 
was used or carried. No person sentenced under this subsection shall 
be eligible for parole during the term of imprisonment imposed 
herein. 
Id. 
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violence” would serve a minimum sentence of five years that was con-
secutive to the sentence for the underlying offense.42
In 1986, Congress again amended the statute with the passage of 
the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act,43 which made the mandatory 
minimum five-year sentence applicable when an offender uses or car-
ries a firearm during a “drug trafficking crime.”44  Between 1986 and 
1998 additional amendments both redefined “drug trafficking crime” 
into the definition that is still used today45 and varied sentence 
lengths based on the type of firearm involved.46
In 1995, the Supreme Court determined what type of activity sat-
isfied the “uses and carries” language of the statute.47  The Court 
unanimously held that for the accused to be liable for “use” of the 
firearm, the accused must have actively employed the firearm so that 
the firearm is an operative factor in the underlying offense.48  Thus, 
the Court substantially narrowed the scope of the statute, decreasing 
its potential use by prosecutors.49
To restore the statute’s effectiveness,50 in 1998 Congress 
amended the statute to ensure that the penalties set forth would ap-
ply not only to someone who uses and carries a firearm, but also to 
 42 Id. 
 43 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a)(2) 
(A–F), 100 Stat. 449, 456–57 (1986). 
 44 Id. 
 45 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 6212, 102 Stat. 4181, 
4360 (“the term ‘drug trafficking crime’ means any felony punishable under the 
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import 
and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 
(46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.)”). 
 46 See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 1101, 104 Stat. 4789, 4829 
(increased sentences for short-barreled shotguns, short-barreled rifles, and destruc-
tive devices); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-322, 110102, 108 Stat. 1796, 1996 (1998) (increased sentences for semi-automatic 
assault weapons). 
 47 Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995). 
 48 Id. at 143. 
 49 Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing for Violent and Drug Trafficking Crimes Involving 
Firearms: Recent Changes and Prospects for Improvement, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 41, 60–61 
(2000) (estimating that “between 1500 and 2250 cases in a typical year were disquali-
fied for Section 924(c) by the Bailey decision”).  To demonstrate how much of an 
impact these estimated numbers had, see 144 CONG. REC. H530, H531 (daily ed. Feb. 
24, 1998) (statement of Rep. McCollum) (“According to the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission, there were 10,576 defendants sentenced from 1991 to 1996 under this sec-
tion.”). 
 50 See 144 CONG. REC. S. 12670 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1998) (statement of Sen. De-
Wine) (referring to the bill as “the Bailey Fix Act, also known as the use or carry 
bill”). 
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one who possesses a firearm during and in relation to a crime.51  
These amendments to the statute were the last substantial changes to 
the statute and have given the statute its current structure and sub-
stance.  In these amendments, Congress also added the “brandish” 
and “discharge” provisions.52  The statute still rejects both probation 
and concurrent sentences,53 creating what is known as a mandatory 
minimum sentence. 
The modern-day mandatory minimum sentences were devel-
oped in 195654 and marked the beginning of a gradual shift in Con-
gress’s sentencing goals from rehabilitation to deterrence.55  Before 
the advent of mandatory minimums, most statutes allowed judges 
great freedom to exercise discretion at sentencing.56  However, since 
the onset of mandatory minimum statutes, defendants have been in-
creasingly vulnerable to generalized penalties that disregard unique 
circumstances.57  By maximizing deterrence and limiting judicial dis-
cretion during sentencing, these statutes may lead to great “miscar-
riages of justice.”58  Justice Kennedy has called for the abolition of 
mandatory minimums, calling them “unwise and unjust.”59  Justice 
Breyer has also criticized them, calling them “fundamentally inconsis-
tent with Congress’ simultaneous effort to create a fair, honest, and 
rational sentencing system through the use of Sentencing Guide-
lines.”60  Similar criticism has been leveled specifically at § 924(c)’s 
mandatory minimum penalties.  For instance, political uproar ensued 
in January 2007, after two U.S. Border Patrol agents received mini-
 51 Mandatory Minimum Prison Sentences for Firearms Violations, Pub. L. No. 
105-386, 112 Stat. 3469, 3469–70 (1998). 
 52 Id. 
 53 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D) (2006). 
 54 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (1991), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/MANMIN.pdf. 
 55 Clare, supra note 38, at 820. 
 56 Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 753, 788 
(2002). 
 57 United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 522–23 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(“The Anglo-American tradition of individualized sentencing is under great pressure 
from a system that has both deprived sentencing judges of much of their discretion 
and imported many questions traditionally handled at the conviction stage into the 
sentencing process.”). 
 58 Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a 
Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1045 (2004). 
 59 Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, 
Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html. 
 60 Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 570 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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mum ten-year sentences under § 924(c)’s discharge provision for 
shooting a suspected drug smuggler.61  The sentences drew heavy 
criticism from members of Congress for being too lengthy, and, as a 
result, lawmakers introduced a rash of legislation to remedy the per-
ceived injustice.62  None of the attempted remedies, however, in-
cluded modification of the statute itself.63
III. HARRIS V. UNITED STATES64
A. The Discharge Provision Is a Sentencing Factor, Not an  
Element of an Offense 
In Harris v. United States in 2002, the Supreme Court analyzed 
the amended statute, specifically the brandish provision. Petitioner 
Harris ran a pawnshop, and at trial he was found guilty of selling 
marijuana to his friend while holstering a semiautomatic pistol at his 
side.65  Normally he carried the gun with him in his shop regardless 
of whether he was selling drugs.66  The federal prosecutor indicted 
Harris under § 924(c)(1)(A), but the indictment said nothing of 
“brandishing” and only alleged the elements from the statute’s prin-
cipal paragraph—that Harris possessed a firearm during the commis-
sion of a drug trafficking crime.67  A judge found Harris guilty as 
charged at a bench trial, found by a preponderance of evidence dur-
ing the sentencing hearing that Harris had brandished the gun, and 
sentenced him to seven years.68  The appellate court subsequently af-
firmed.69
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court sought to deter-
mine whether the “brandish” provision was a sentencing factor or a 
 61 Jerry Seper, Border Agents’ Punishment “High,” Sentencing Guidelines Directed by 
Congress, Prosecutor Says, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2007, at A4. 
 62 Fred Lucas, No More Federal Money to Jail Border Agents, Congressman Says at 
CNSNEWS.COM, Jan. 26, 2007, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/viewstory.asp?Page=/ 
Nation/archive/200701/NAT20070126e.html. Attempted remedies included peti-
tioning the president to exercise his presidential veto, drafting legislation to deny 
funding specifically for the incarceration of the agents, and attempting to vacate the 
court’s ruling.  Id. 
 63 Douglas A. Berman, Using the Border Agent Case as a Catalyst for Federal Sentencing 
Reform, SENT’G L. & POL’Y, Jan. 29, 2007, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing 
_law_and_policy/2007/01/using_the_borde.html. 
 64 536 U.S. 545. 
 65 Id. at 550. 
 66 Id. at 573, n. 1 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 67 Id. at 551. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
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separate offense.70  The Court presumed from the structure of § 
924(c) that “its principal paragraph defines a single crime and its 
subsections identify sentencing factors.”71  The Court also found no 
congressional tradition of treating “brandishing” and “discharging” as 
separate offenses.72  Moreover, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
had a history of treating “brandishing” and “discharging” as sentence 
enhancements.73  The Court thus determined that the 1998 amend-
ments were likely a byproduct of those guidelines.74
Finally, the Court found that the incremental increase from five 
to seven years under the brandishing provision was consistent with 
the traditional role of sentencing enhancements because “the re-
quired findings constrain, rather then extend, the sentencing judge’s 
discretion.”75  The Court found of particular importance the fact that 
the brandishing provision only increases the minimum sentence un-
der a statute which carries no maximum sentence.76  For instance, 
under the statute, a judge could sentence a defendant anywhere from 
the prescribed mandatory minimum up to life in prison, regardless of 
whether the defendant brandished a firearm.77  The Court compared 
§ 924(c) to the statute at issue in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,78 which 
also imposed mandatory minimum sentences and which the Court 
also upheld.79  The Harris Court found that the mandatory penalty 
enhancement under the brandishing provision does not implicate 
the constitutional concerns that were raised in Apprendi.80  The Court 
therefore had no problem treating the brandishing provision as a 
sentencing factor when it only slightly increased the mandatory min-
imum sentence under a statute that allowed a judge to sentence the 
defendant “well in excess of seven years.”81  The Harris Court, how-
 70 Harris, 536 U.S. at 552. 
 71 Id. at 553. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. (noting that “[u]nder the Sentencing Guidelines, moreover, brandishing 
and discharging affect the sentences for numerous federal crimes”). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 554. 
 76 Harris, 536 U.S. at 557. 
 77 Id. at 554; see also United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 811 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(noting that “§ 924(c)’s unstated statutory maximum is life in prison”). 
 78 477 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 79 Id. at 91. 
 80 Harris, 536 U.S. at 565. 
 81 Id. at 554. 
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ever, did not discuss the mens rea requirement of the discharge or 
brandish provision because it was not raised in the petitioner’s brief.82
The practical consequences of determining that a statutory pro-
vision is a sentencing factor are substantial.  Sentencing factors can 
be tried in a separate hearing where the rules of evidence and bur-
dens of proof are heavily altered in favor of the government.83  Once 
the government establishes “a threshold mens rea to convict the de-
fendant of the substantive crime,” the courts generally have not re-
quired finding mens rea during the sentencing phase to increase pe-
nalties.84  Critics argue against sentencing hearings because these 
hearings fail to provide the same procedural protections as trials, 
such as the right to confront adverse witnesses, notice of the charges, 
and the right to trial by jury.85
B. Yet Harris Teeters on the Brink of Invalidity 
The validity of Harris’s ruling is tenuous.86  The Harris opinion 
garnered only a slim five-to-four plurality—Justices Thomas, Stevens, 
Souter, and Ginsberg dissented, while Justice Breyer merely con-
curred in part.87  The four dissenting Justices argued that punishment 
under the increased mandatory minimum penalty for brandishing 
should afford defendants all the constitutional protections that are 
afforded under any other offense.88  The dissent reasoned that the 
same principles that guided the Court in Apprendi were also present 
here when dealing with mandatory minimum sentences89:“[w]hether 
 82 Brief of Petitioner, Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (No. 00-
10666). 
 83 Richard Singer, The Model Penal Code and Three Two (Possibly Only One) Ways 
Courts Avoid Mens Rea, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 139, 145 (2000). 
 84 Alun Griffiths, Comment, People v. Ryan: A Trap for the Unwary, 61 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1011, 1028–29 (1995). 
 85 Jacqueline E. Ross, What Makes Sentencing Facts Controversial?  Four Problems Ob-
scured by One Solution, 47 VILL. L. REV. 965, 965 (2002). 
 86 United States v. Malouf, 377 F. Supp. 2d 315, 327 (D. Mass. 2005). 
 87 Harris, 536 U.S. at 569–83. 
 88 Id. at 579–80 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
[T]here are no logical grounds for treating facts triggering mandatory 
minimums any differently than facts that increase the statutory maxi-
mum. . . . In either case the defendant must be afforded the proce-
dural protections of notice, a jury trial, and a heightened standard of 
proof with respect to the facts warranting exposure to a greater pen-
alty. 
Id. 
 89 Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It is true that Apprendi concerned a fact 
that increased the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, but 
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one raises the floor or raises the ceiling it is impossible to dispute that 
the defendant is exposed to greater punishment than is otherwise 
prescribed.”90  The departure of Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor, 
two of the Justices in the Harris plurality, has increased the fragility of 
that decision.  Their replacements, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito, recently diverged from Harris’s ruling in determining the 
breadth of Apprendi’s application during sentencing.91
In addition to Harris’s foundational cracks, federal courts have 
expressed doubts as to its continuing validity in light of recent Su-
preme Court decisions in Blakely v. Washington92 and Booker v. United 
States.93  Through Blakely and Booker, the Court extended the breadth 
of Apprendi’s Sixth Amendment jury protections, although not spe-
cifically to federal mandatory minimum statutes.94  Several lower and 
appellate courts have inferred from these recent opinions that Harris 
is no longer good law, arguing that the Court’s reasoning in Blakely 
and Booker extends to § 924(c)’s mandatory minimum sentencing en-
hancements.95  Moreover, courts have treated the discharge provision 
the principles upon which it relied apply with equal force to those facts that expose 
the defendant to a higher mandatory minimum.”). 
 90 Id. 
 91 See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007).  Chief Justice Roberts 
joined the majority in invalidating California’s determinate sentencing scheme for 
violating Apprendi’s rule that juries must determine all facts that expose a defendant 
to a greater sentence.   Justice Alito, dissenting, would have upheld the sentencing 
scheme, positing that “[t]he Court . . . has never suggested that all factual findings 
that affect a defendant’s sentence must be made by a jury.”  Id. at 873 (Alito, J., dis-
senting). 
 92 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 93 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 94 See Id. at 243 (U.S. Sentencing Guidelines); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (Washing-
ton State Sentencing Reform Act). 
 95 United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 647–648 (9th Cir. 2005) (Bea, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that Harris is limited by Booker, in that § 924(c)’s statutory maximum for 
Apprendi purposes is now the five-year maximum imposed by the Sentencing Guide-
lines unless the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant discharged 
the firearm); United States v. Harris, 397 F.3d 404, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2005) (conclud-
ing that “Booker does require that § 924 Firearm-Type Provision enhancements be 
charged in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”).  The 
Sixth Circuit noted in dicta that it could not apply its conclusion to § 924(c)’s dis-
charge provision, even though the provision that it ruled on is similar in structure 
and form, simply because doing so would expressly violate Harris’s holding that the 
discharge provision was a sentencing factor to be found by a judge.  Id. at 414 n.5; see 
also United States v. Malouf, 377 F. Supp. 2d 315, 324–25 (D. Mass. 2005) (positing 
that the Supreme Court’s extension of the Sixth Amendment in Blakely “necessarily 
casts doubt on Harris’s distinction between mandatory minimum provisions and 
statutory maximums. . . . Moreover, if Federal Sentencing Guidelines troubled the 
majority in Booker, despite the possibility of downward departures, mandatory mini-
mum provisions are likely to be of even greater concern.”). 
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as a fact to be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, even 
after Harris.96  For instance, the lower court in United States v. Brown, 
in which a defendant was charged under § 924(c), sent to the jury the 
question of whether the defendant discharged the weapon to ensure 
compliance with Apprendi’s constitutional requirements.97
Because Harris has not been expressly overruled, this Comment 
must proceed under the assumption that § 924(c)’s discharge provi-
sion is a sentencing factor to be found by a judge by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  However, in light of the Court’s recent sentencing 
opinions, the validity of Harris’s conclusions remains doubtful.  Cer-
tainly if punishment under the discharge provision required the same 
constitutional protections as any other offense, the arguments for 
applying strict liability would diminish. 
IV. THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAL 
WRESTLE OVER INTENT 
The Federal Courts of Appeal are split regarding whether sen-
tencing judges are required to determine mens rea under § 924(c)’s 
discharge provision.98  One side of the split would hold a defendant 
strictly liable under the discharge provision regardless of the defen-
dant’s intent.99  The other side of the split requires the judge to de-
termine that a defendant has formed a requisite intent before impos-
ing the mandatory ten-year sentence.100  This Part explores in detail 
both sides of the debate by discussing the various methods that the 
courts of appeals have used to analyze the issue and the reasoning 
behind their conclusions. 
A. Strict Liability and the Nava-Sotelo Rule 
The Sixth Circuit was the first to address this issue, in United 
States v. Tunstall,101 in which the defendant robbed a bank with a 
 96 See Brief of Appellee at 38–39 n.11, United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 154 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (No. 04-3159) (explaining that at trial, the jury determined the issue of 
whether defendant discharged the firearm, even though “[p]utting the issue of 
whether the firearm was discharged to the jury was not required and contrary to the 
ruling of Harris”). 
 97 See id. 
 98 Compare United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2003), and 
United States v. Tunstall, 49 Fed. App’x 581 (6th Cir. 2002), with United States v. 
Brown, 449 F.3d 154 (D.C. Cir. 2006), and United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 640 
(9th Cir. 2005). 
 99 Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d at 1206; Tunstall, 49 Fed. App’x at 582. 
 100 Brown, 449 F.3d at 156; Dare, 425 F.3d at 641 n.3. 
 101 Tunstall, 49 Fed. App’x at 581. 
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shotgun and accidentally discharged the shotgun upon fleeing the 
bank.102  Tunstall pled guilty to armed robbery and to using a firearm 
while committing a crime of violence under § 924(c)(1), and the 
judge enhanced his sentence to ten years because the firearm was 
discharged.103  The Sixth Circuit approved Tunstall’s sentence with-
out a great deal of analysis, noting simply that section 924(c) lacked 
an express intent requirement.104  However, the court also found that 
Tunstall’s ten-year sentence would alternatively have been appropri-
ate under § 924(c)(1)(B)(i), because the weapon he used was a shot-
gun.105  Thus, the opinion provides little insight regarding the analysis 
of the statute’s discharge provision. 
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Nava-Sotelo,106 conducted a 
more thorough analysis and found that a sentencing judge must in-
crease a sentence to ten years for an accidental discharge, regardless 
of the defendant’s intent.107  In a plot to free his brother from federal 
prison, Nava-Sotelo approached two officers with a loaded firearm in 
his hand while they were escorting his brother from a dental clinic 
back to prison.108  One officer struggled with Nava-Sotelo and 
grabbed for the gun, causing the firearm to discharge into the 
ground while Nava-Sotelo’s finger was on the trigger.109  Nava-Sotelo 
had never pointed the firearm at anyone.110
Nava-Sotelo was charged under several federal statutes, includ-
ing discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence under § 924(c), 
and he pled guilty to all counts.111  During the pre-sentencing hear-
ing, the district court addressed Nava-Sotelo’s objections that “he 
should receive only a seven-year consecutive sentence . . . rather than 
a ten-year sentence, because the discharge of the firearm was acci-
dental and involuntary.”112  The court agreed and sentenced him to 
seven years.113  The government “accept[ed] the district court’s fac-
tual finding that the discharge of the firearm was accidental, even in-
voluntary.  Nonetheless, it insist[ed] the language of § 924(c) plainly 
 102 Id. at 582. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 354 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 107 Id. at 1206. 
 108 Id. at 1203. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 1204. 
 112 Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d at 1204. 
 113 Id. 
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requires the district court to impose a ten-year consecutive sentence; 
whether the discharge of the firearm was intentional or accidental is 
of no moment.”114
First, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the plain language of 
the statute does not expressly require that the defendant intention-
ally discharge the weapon to be liable for the ten-year mandatory 
minimum.115  Instead of using traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion and exploring legislative history and intent, the court focused on 
the ruling in Harris that the brandishing and discharge provisions are 
sentencing factors.116  The court distinguished a sentencing factor 
from an element of an offense, declaring that “[o]nly the latter re-
quires a mens rea.”117  To support this proposition, the court cited its 
prior decision in United States v. Eads.118  In Eads, the court held that a 
person carrying a machine gun during a drug trafficking offense 
could be given a minimum sentence of thirty consecutive years in 
prison under § 924(c) without finding that the defendant knew that 
the firearm was a machine gun.119  The court based its decision on its 
finding that Congress intended that the type of weapon be a sentenc-
ing factor rather than an element of the offense.120
To bolster its assertion that sentencing factors do not require a 
finding of mens rea, the Tenth Circuit cited numerous opinions from 
federal courts of appeals that discarded the mens rea requirement for 
sentencing factors under various federal statutes and guidelines.121  
The court further explained that Nava-Sotelo had already demon-
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 1205. 
 116 Id. at 1205–06. 
 117 Id. at 1206 n.8. 
 118 191 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 119 Id. at 1214.  The Eads court ruled under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B) (1994), 
which provides: 
If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation of this sub-
section— 
(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiau-
tomatic assault weapon, the person shall be sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment of not less than 10 years; or 
(ii) is a machine-gun or a destructive device, or is equipped with 
a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years. 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B). 
 120 Eads, 191 F.3d at 1214. 
 121 United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing 
United States v. King, 345 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Gonzalez, 262 
F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Schnell, 982 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Lavender, 224 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
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strated his “vicious will”; thus he was not being penalized for his “ap-
parently innocent conduct.”122
Finally, the court dismissed the defendant’s rule of lenity argu-
ment by finding Congress’s purpose in making this provision a sen-
tencing factor was clear and unambiguous,123 thus falling back on its 
original claim that sentencing factors do not require a mens rea.  
Since the Supreme Court in Harris concluded that the discharge pro-
vision is a sentencing factor, anyone who argues that the provision 
requires a finding of mens rea would be “shoveling sand against the 
tide.”124  The Southern District of New York reiterated this proposi-
tion in United States v. Whitley.125  In Whitley, the defendant held up two 
store clerks with a firearm.  While stealing money from the cash regis-
ter, he accidentally shot himself in the face.126  The court, citing Nava-
Sotelo, simply ruled that a jury need not consider the defendant’s in-
tent to discharge a firearm under § 924(c).127  Moreover, other courts 
have relied on this rule to hold defendants strictly liable for sentenc-
ing enhancements in other provisions under § 924(c).128
In United States v. Dean,129 the Eleventh Circuit followed the 
Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Nava-Sotelo and affirmed that § 924(c)’s dis-
charge provision lacked a mens rea requirement.130  Petitioner Dean 
was convicted of a bank robbery in which he had accidentally dis-
charged his gun while grabbing the money.131  Recognizing that the 
provision lacks any express mens rea requirement, the court of ap-
peals focused on the fact that defendants convicted of the offense 
triggering sentence enhancement pursuant to § 924(c) have already 
demonstrated a vicious will; therefore, “the danger of imposing pun-
ishment upon an innocent party is absent.”132  This analysis mirrors 
the Tenth Circuit reasoning in Nava-Sotelo, yet the court in Dean did 
not go so far as to rule that sentencing factors are inherently strict li-
ability provisions.  Moreover, the court noted that discharging a fire-
arm presents a greater risk of harm than mere possession or bran-
 122 Id. at 1207. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 1205. 
 125 No. S1-04-Cr.-1381, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29868 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2005). 
 126 Id. at *2. 
 127 Id. at *7–8. 
 128 See, e.g., United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 812 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 129 No. 06-14918, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3507 (11th Cir. Feb. 20, 2008). 
 130 Id. at *12. 
 131 Id. at *3. 
 132 Id. at *12. 
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dishing, and that the enhancements apply to conduct, not intent.133  
Finally, the court denied that the presumption against strict liability 
exists when dealing with sentencing enhancements.134
B. Requirement Intent 
The Ninth Circuit briefly addressed the issue of a requirement of 
intent in United States v. Dare.135  Dare brought two men to his home 
from a bar, one of whom was a police informant, and sold the infor-
mant a $200 bag of marijuana.136  Dare then produced his shotgun, 
stating “that he ‘didn’t want any badges coming back at me for selling 
drugs.’”137  He offered the gun to his friend to shoot, yet his friend 
declined to do so.138  Dare, who had a history of shooting off his gun 
with visitors,139 fired the gun out his door into the air.140
Dare pleaded guilty for possessing the shotgun in furtherance of 
the drug trafficking crime but disputed the penalty under the dis-
charge provision, 141 claiming that he was intoxicated and that the 
provision required a finding of specific intent.142  The district court 
judge reluctantly sentenced Dare to ten years under the discharge 
provision, upset that he “had no discretion here.”143  Meanwhile, the 
judge sentenced Dare to zero months for possession of marijuana.144
The majority of the circuit court’s opinion discussed the appli-
cable Sixth Amendment protections for the discharge provision un-
der Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker and the standard of proof required to 
sentence a defendant under the provision.145  The court merely ad-
 133 Id. at *13. 
 134 Id. 
 135 425 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 136 Id. at 636. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 644 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
 140 Id. at 636 (Leavy, J.) 
 141 United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 142 Id. at 641 n.3. 
 143 Id. at 637.  The trial judge felt that the mandatory sentence was unfair: 
You have a man who’s lived in a community for 25 years, who is recog-
nized as hard working, honest, reliable, who would give the shirt off of 
his back to anybody, who has given two sons to this country to defend 
this country, and we’re going to lock him up for ten years and that’s 
not outrageous? I think it is. So I will be a part of the outrage. Unwill-
ingly. But I’m going to do it. 
Id. 
 144 Id. at 638. 
 145 Id. at 638–48. 
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dressed Dare’s intent argument in a footnote, noting that the statute 
does not define “discharge,” and determined that the discharge pro-
vision under § 924(c) requires a finding of general intent.146  Thus, 
the court posited, Dare’s intoxication defense failed.147
The D.C. Circuit conducted a thorough analysis of the discharge 
provision’s intent requirement in United States v. Brown.148  Brown en-
tered a bank with a semiautomatic pistol and forced bank employees 
at gunpoint to fill a bag with cash.149  As Brown zipped up the bag, his 
gun went off.150  He was startled and asked around if anyone was hurt, 
but no one was.151  The trial court, being overly cautious in light of 
Apprendi, sent the issue of the discharge to the jury to determine be-
yond a reasonable doubt.152  While deliberating, the jury asked the 
judge whether the gun had to be discharged knowingly, and the 
judge responded that it did not.153  The jury found that the firearm 
had been discharged, and the judge imposed a ten-year sentence.154
On appeal, the court of appeals analyzed the structure of § 
924(c)(1)(A), noting that that the first two provisions—the underly-
ing offense and brandishing provisions—both required proof of 
mens rea.155  In examining the applicability of the underlying offense 
provision of § 924(c)(1), the court looked to United States v. Harris,156 
in which the same court had interpreted the pre-1998 version of § 
924(c) and determined that intent was required.157  In its analysis of 
the brandishing provision, the court considered the statute’s defini-
tion of brandish and found it to contain an explicit intent require-
ment.158  The statute defines “brandish” as “to display all or part of 
the firearm, or otherwise make the presence of the firearm known to 
another person, in order to intimidate that person, regardless of 
whether the firearm is directly visible to that person.”159  The court 
 146 Id. at 641–42 n.3. 
 147 United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 641–42 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 148 449 F.3d 154 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 149 Id. at 155. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Brief of Appellee at 38–39 n.11, United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 154 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (No. 04-3159). 
 153 Brown, 449 F.3d at 155. 
 154 Id. at 155–56. 
 155 Id. 
 156 959 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  Do not confuse this case with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Harris, 536 U.S. 545 (2006).  See supra Part II. 
 157 Harris, 959 F.2d at 258–59. 
 158 Brown, 449 F.3d at 157. 
 159 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4) (2006). 
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reasoned that § 924(c) defines “brandish” because Congress intended 
the term to have a broader meaning than the dictionary definition.160  
For instance, under the statute a defendant can “brandish” a hidden 
or invisible firearm by making its presence known.161  Indeed, the 
drafters of § 924(c) stated that 
[t]he Committee expects that even when a person displays the 
outline of a firearm through clothing or other similar shroud the 
definition of brandish will be satisfied.  For example, this would 
encompass such conduct as a person pointing a firearm through a 
coat pocket, so that only the outline of the barrel of the firearm is 
visible.162
Thus, the court concluded, the natural progression of the statute is to 
penalize increasingly culpable behavior, and since discharging a fire-
arm is a more culpable act, it should require proof of mens rea as 
well.163  
Expressing distaste for strict liability penalties, the court mar-
shaled various arguments to support its position.  Two doctrines that 
shaped the court’s discussion include the general presumption 
against strict liability in criminal statutes and the rule of lenity.164  The 
court was also concerned that clearly innocent defendants could be 
held strictly liable for the discharge of a firearm, regardless of their 
role in the discharge.165  For instance, under a strict liability reading, 
a defendant might be penalized if a third party took control of the 
firearm and discharged it or if the firearm discharged when the de-
fendant dropped it to comply with a police order.166
The court also confronted its prior holding in United States v. 
Harris,167 in which it found that a provision in the pre-1998 version of 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)—prescribing a thirty-year minimum sentence to 
defendants who use a machine-gun during the commission of a 
crime—does not require a finding that the defendant know of the 
precise nature of the weapon.168  The Harris court refused to imply a 
mens rea requirement into the machine gun provision because it 
could not distinguish culpability between a person who commits a 
crime with a pistol and one who uses a machine-gun, claiming that 
 160 Brown, 449 F.3d at 157. 
 161 Id. 
 162 H.R. REP. NO. 105-344, at 12–13 (1997). 
 163 Brown, 449 F.3d at 156. 
 164 Id. at 157. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 959 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 168 Id. at 258–59. 
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“the act is different, but the mental state is equally blameworthy.”169  
After examining this ruling, the Brown court professed that the con-
clusion reached in Harris was not only cast in doubt by dicta in a sub-
sequent Supreme Court opinion170 but was also easily distinguishable 
from the facts of the present case.171
In conclusion, the Brown court criticized the Tenth Circuit’s 
holding in Nava-Sotelo as “broad” and stated that “the proposition that 
the Constitution imposes no such requirement (assuming its truth) 
responds neither to our concern for disrupting § 924(c)’s apparent 
structure nor to the presumption against strict liability in criminal 
statutes and the rule of lenity.”172  This conclusion implies that even 
though the discharge provision may be a sentencing factor, such a 
finding does not automatically relieve the state from the burden of 
proving criminal intent.  That implication directly conflicts with the 
proposition stated in Nava-Sotelo.173
After determining that the discharge provision required some 
finding of intent, the Brown court pondered what level of intent 
would suffice.174  Following the Model Penal Code’s approach to sta-
tutory interpretation,175 the court settled on a form of general intent 
that included purpose, knowledge, or recklessness.176  It believed that 
requiring some minimal level of intent was the best way to ensure the 
“exclusion of mere accident” as a punishable state of mind.177  The 
court then found that Brown did not act recklessly when he dis-
charged his weapon.178  It reasoned that bank robbers who brandish 
weapons are acting inherently reckless; therefore, holding a robber 
accountable for a discharge because of this fact would nullify and 
make meaningless the mens rea requirement under the discharge 
 169 Id. at 259. 
 170 Brown, 449 F.3d at 158 (noting that “the difference between carrying a pistol 
and carrying a machinegun [is] ‘great, both in degree and kind’” (quoting Castillo v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 120, 126 (2000))). 
 171 Id. (opining that the characteristics of a weapon would almost always be obvi-
ous to the defendant). 
 172 Id. 
 173 United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202, 1206 n.8 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 174 Brown, 449 F.3d at 158–59. 
 175 Id. at 158 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1985)) (“When the culpability 
sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such 
element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect the-
reto.”). 
 176 Id. at 158–59. 
 177 Id. at 158. 
 178 Id. at 159. 
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provision.179  Thus, in the D.C. Circuit, a defendant can be sentenced 
under § 924(c)’s discharge provision only if “the discharge itself arose 
out of any act manifesting additional disregard of others’ safety.”180
V. THE DUBIOUS RULE THAT SENTENCING  
FACTORS NEVER REQUIRE DETERMINATIONS OF INTENT 
The Tenth Circuit in Nava-Sotelo found the gun control statute to 
be unambiguous; therefore, it conducted a more limited statutory 
analysis than the D.C. Circuit conducted in Brown.181  The Tenth Cir-
cuit implied strict liability into § 924(c)’s discharge provision by 
combining the Supreme Court’s ruling in Harris that the discharge 
provision is a sentencing factor with the blanket generalization that 
sentencing factors do not require mens rea.182  In doing so, the court 
promulgated a rule that defendants will always be strictly liable for 
any sentence enhancement that is not a separate offense.183  This Part 
argues that the rule relied on by the Nava-Sotelo court—that mens rea 
is not implicated by a sentencing factor—is a distorted interpretation 
that has little legal support or justification. 
Indisputably, with the creation of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines and mandatory minimum statutes, federal courts have increas-
ingly treated sentencing enhancements as strict liability penalties.184  
 179 Id. 
 180 Brown, 449 F.3d at 159. 
 181 United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 182 Id. at 1205–06. 
 183 Id. at 1206 (“Because the brandishing and discharge provisions of § 924(c) are 
sentencing factors, not elements, the government was not required to show that Na-
va-Sotelo knowingly or intentionally discharged his weapon.  Accountability is strict; 
the mere fact that the weapon discharged is controlling.”).  Courts have since cited 
this rule to dismiss mens rea requirements under other provisions within 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c).  See United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 812 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that 
defendant need not know that the firearm was a machine-gun to be sentenced under 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2006)). 
 184 See Singer, supra note 83, at 143 (“Between 1986 and 2000, federal courts (and 
to some extent their state counterparts) often avoided the question of whether mens 
rea applied to a statutorily enunciated fact by denying that the fact was an element at 
all but was, rather, a ‘sentencing factor.’”); Griffiths, supra note 84, at 1028–29. 
Courts interpreting the mens rea requirements of both the mandatory-
minimum statutes and the Sentencing Guidelines have emphasized 
their tendency to bifurcate the trial into discrete phases: a trial phase 
and a penalty phase.  At the trial phase, prosecutors establish a thresh-
old mens rea to convict the defendant of the substantive crime.  At the 
penalty phase, therefore, there is no need to prove an additional mens 
rea for any of the aggravating factors linked to severity of sentence.  
These are not part of the “corpus delicti” of the crime, and therefore 
are factors beyond the reach of mens rea. 
NAPORANO (FINAL) 12/1/2008  12:45:32 PM 
1588 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1567 
 
Courts have sentenced defendants under various enhancements re-
gardless of mental culpability.185  For instance, the cases that the 
Nava-Sotelo court relied on for its proposition that the discharge pro-
vision does not contain a mens rea requirement all found that sen-
tencing enhancements, whether Guideline enhancements or criminal 
statutes, are strict liability penalties.186  Ironically, however, two out of 
the four cases that the Nava-Sotelo court cited to support its rule that 
sentencing factors are strict liability penalties are from the Ninth Cir-
cuit,187 which would later rule in Dare that § 924(c)’s discharge provi-
sion, a sentencing factor as defined by the Supreme Court, did re-
quire intent.188  Nava-Sotelo’s holding seems to have confused that 
court’s statement that “sentencing factors . . . are not normally required 
to carry their own mens rea requirements”189 with its own conclusion 
that sentencing factors can never carry their own mens rea require-
ments.190
The remaining cases cited as support in Nava-Sotelo may also be 
distinguished by their reasoning.  The courts in these cases all con-
cluded that the enhancements at issue lacked intent requirements, 
but only after analyzing the statute or Federal Sentencing Guideline 
provision’s structure and history.191  For instance, the King court re-
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 185 Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 891–92 
(1999). 
Criminal statutes frequently contain a strict liability element that makes 
a greater crime out of conduct that is already a crime without the strict 
liability element.  Although the constitutionality of this use of strict li-
ability is often challenged, it is almost always upheld. Thus, the survey 
revealed many decisions upholding statutes punishing felony murder 
(imposing strict liability as to causing a death during the intentional 
commission of a felony), the sale of illegal drugs in specially protected 
areas (imposing strict liability as to the specially protected area), and 
involving a minor in a crime, as victim or participant (imposing strict 
liability as to the age of the minor), as well as statutes enhancing sen-
tences for otherwise illegal possession of a weapon because of some 
special fact about the weapon, such as it being stolen (imposing strict 
liability as to the special fact about the weapon). 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 186 United States v. King, 345 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Gonzalez, 
262 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lavender, 224 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Schnell, 982 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 187 Gonzalez, 262 F.3d 867; Lavender, 224 F.3d 939. 
 188 United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 641–42 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 189 Lavender, 224 F.3d at 941(emphasis added). 
 190 United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 191 King, 345 F.3d at 152–53; Schnell, 982 F.2d at 220 (“As the Mobley and Taylor 
courts have demonstrated, both the structure and the history of the guidelines clear-
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lied on the structure of 21 U.S.C. § 841,192 which places a mens rea 
requirement under subsection (a), the substantive offense, but not 
under subsection (b), the penalty section.193  The court noted that 
since “one need not read subsection (a) in order for subsection (b) 
to be grammatically coherent,” then subsection (b) is independent 
and does not retain subsection (a)’s mens rea requirement.194  But § 
924(c)(1)(A)(iii), the discharge provision, is an incomplete phrase, 
and seemingly must be read in conjunction with § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) to 
be grammatically coherent.  Since the underlying offense, § 
924(c)(1)(A)(i), has been found to have an intent requirement,195 
the discharge provision would then require intent as well under 
King’s reasoning.196
 Not all federal courts agree that mens rea’s role disappears 
during the sentencing phase.197  For example, several federal appel-
late courts have implied an intent requirement under a Guideline 
enhancement that increases the penalty for possession of child por-
nography if the material is sadistic or violent.198  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has not ruled on this particular issue199 but has ex-
ly show that the Sentencing Commission intended to omit the element of mens rea 
in § 2K2.1(b)(4).”). 
 192 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006). 
 193 Id. 
 194 King, 345 F.3d at 153. 
 195 United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Nava-Sotelo, 354 
F.3d at 1205. 
 196 Cf. King, 345 F.3d at 153. 
 197 See United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
The operation of the mens rea principle takes on a special character at 
the sentencing stage.  Because most theoretical and doctrinal analysis 
of problems of mental states has focused on the conviction stage, one 
might assume that concerns about the mens rea principle fall away once 
a finding of guilt has attached.  In fact, the opposite is true. 
Id.; see also United States v. Burke, 888 F.2d 862, 866 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Although 
cases generally apply [the presumption against strict liability] to statutes that define 
criminal offenses, we have little doubt that it should also be applied to legal norms 
that define aggravating circumstances for purposes of sentencing.”). 
 198 A defendant convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (2006) for knowingly re-
ceiving child pornography will be subject to a four-level enhancement under U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(3) if “the offense involved material that 
portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence.”  Some cir-
cuit courts require a finding that the defendant intended to receive material that was 
sadistic, masochistic, or violent. See United States v. Burnette, No. 99-5585, 2000 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 26777 (6th Cir. Oct. 17, 2000); United States v. Tucker, 136 F.3d 763, 
764 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 734 (5th Cir. 1995). 
But see United States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2001) (intent not required). 
 199 Kennedy, supra note 56, at 755. 
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tended the rule of lenity to statutory provisions that enhance penal-
ties.200
The holding in Nava-Sotelo is further weakened by the fact that 
the pillar on which it stands, the Harris Court’s ruling that relegates 
the discharge provision to sentencing factor status, was tenuously de-
cided by a five-to-four majority201 and cast into doubt by subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions.202  Nava-Sotelo relied on Harris to demon-
strate that sentencing enhancements deny defendants the full range 
of procedural rights.203  Should the Court overrule or modify the 
holding in Harris, a sentencing enhancement that mandates three 
additional years in prison would invoke the full panoply of rights, in-
cluding an intent requirement. 
VI. WHY § 924(C)’S DISCHARGE PROVISION SHOULD NOT 
PENALIZE UNINTENTIONAL CONDUCT 
A brief description of tools used by judges to determine legisla-
tive intent is necessary for an analysis of the discharge provision’s in-
tent requirement.  An overriding concept in statutory interpretation 
of criminal statutes is the presumption of mens rea.  The mens rea 
principle was summed up by William Blackstone as follows: “an un-
warrantable act without a vicious will is no crime at all.  So that to 
constitute a crime against human laws, there must be, first, a vicious 
will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious 
will.”204  This principle has long been recognized as a staple for crimi-
nal punishment205 and continues to permeate modern criminal law as 
an indispensable theory.206  Yet the Supreme Court has never created 
a hard rule defining mens rea’s constitutional role in statutory inter-
pretation,207 much less clear guidance establishing the connection be-
 200 Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980). 
 201 See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text. 
 202 See supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text. 
 203 United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 204 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *20–21. 
 205 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n.4 (1952). 
 206 See id. at 250 (describing mens rea as “no provincial or transient notion.  It is as 
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human 
will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between 
good and evil.”); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) (“The existence 
of mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-
American criminal jurisprudence.”). 
 207 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619–20 (1994) (“Neither this Court nor, 
so far as we are aware, any other has undertaken to delineate a precise line or set 
forth comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between crimes that require a mental 
element and crimes that do not.” (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260)); see also Darryl 
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tween criminal intent and sentencing factors under required manda-
tory minimum statutes.208  Instead, federal courts have been interpret-
ing statutes by using a variety of tools that include the rule of lenity 
and the presumption against strict liability.209  
The rule of lenity was originally developed in seventeenth- to 
eighteenth-century England to nullify harsh, unwarranted penal-
ties.210  When courts are faced with competing interpretations of a 
statutory provision and one would increase the defendant’s penalty 
more than the other, the court should choose the more lenient in-
terpretation if congressional intent is unclear.211  The touchstone of 
lenity is statutory ambiguity.212  If analysis of a statute’s language, 
structure, history, and policies fails to reveal Congress’s intent regard-
ing a specific statutory provision, the defendant’s interpretation of 
the statute should prevail.213  The rule, although its enforcement is 
criticized as sporadic and unpredictable,214 has been consistently ap-
plied by the Supreme Court to prevent the criminalization of unin-
tentional conduct.215  Additionally, the Court has used lenity to inter-
pret statutory crimes as well as statutory provisions that increase 
penalties for those crimes, for, according to the Supreme Court, “this 
principle of statutory construction applies not only to interpretations 
of the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the pen-
alties they impose.”216  Thus, mandatory minimum sentencing en-
hancements are subject to the rule of lenity. 
Another doctrine of statutory interpretation, and one which 
grew out of the Court’s enmity toward strict liability crimes,217 is that 
K. Brown, Watching Legislatures for Apprendi’s Effects on Plea Bargaining, 4 CAL. CRIM. L. 
REV. 3, 11 (2002) (describing Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), as “having 
suggested a constitutional requirement of mens rea that has since gone nowhere; 
even though the Court disfavors strict liability crimes by interpreting statutes to con-
tain mens rea elements, no due process requirement has evolved from Lambert to se-
riously limit strict liability”). 
 208 Kennedy, supra note 56, at 755. 
 209 See United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 452–53 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Liparota v. 
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1984). 
 210 Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2421, 2424 (2006). 
 211 Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980). 
 212 Id. at 387 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980)). 
 213 Id. 
 214 The New Rule of Lenity, supra note 210, at 2423. 
 215 Id. at 2431–33 (citing Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 
(2005); United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995); Staples v. United States, 511 
U.S. 600 (1994); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994); United States v. 
Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505 (1992)). 
 216 Bifulco, 447 U.S. at 387. 
 217 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437–38 (1978). 
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courts will interpret ambiguous statutes with a presumption against 
strict liability.218  The Court will not dismiss an intent requirement in 
statutory provisions because of a “simple omission of the appropriate 
phrase from the statutory definition.”219  Instead, congressional intent 
to discard a scienter requirement within a statute must be accompa-
nied by some form of evidence of that intent within the statute’s 
structure or legislative history.220
From one perspective (essentially that of the D.C. Circuit), the 
issue of whether § 924(c)’s discharge provision requires a finding of 
criminal intent seems simply to be one of traditional statutory inter-
pretation.221  Thus, under principles of statutory construction, con-
gressional purpose regarding whether a scienter is a required ele-
ment must be determined by analyzing the text, structure, and history 
of the statute.222  This Part argues that a traditional statutory analysis 
of the text, structure, history, and purpose of § 924(c)’s discharge 
provision produces an implied intent requirement, and alternatively, 
that the provision’s intent requirement is ambiguous and should be 
construed according to the rule of lenity and the presumption 
against strict liability. 
While the underlying provision that criminalizes possession of a 
weapon during the commission of a violent or drug trafficking crime 
contains no express intent requirement, the courts have implied an 
intent requirement.223  The brandish and discharge provisions of § 
924(c) also lack express intent requirements.224  However, as noted by 
the court in Brown,225 the statute contains a separate subsection that 
defines “brandish.”226  The majority of courts that have heard this is-
sue have interpreted the definition of “brandish” as containing a re-
quirement that the convicted intended to brandish the firearm.227  
 218 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–63 (1952). 
 219 U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 438. 
 220 Id. (“Certainly far more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase 
from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent re-
quirement.”). 
 221 United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 222 United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 53 (1994). 
 223 Brown, 449 F.3d at 156; United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th 
Cir. 2003). 
 224 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii–iii) (2000). 
 225 Brown, 449 F.3d at 156. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id.; United States v. Beaudion, 416 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To ‘bran-
dish’ a weapon for purposes of § 924(c)(1), then, requires: 1) the open display of the 
firearm, or knowledge of the firearm’s presence by another in some manner, and 2) 
the purpose of intimidation.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Clark, 41 Fed. Appx. 
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The statute, however, does not include a definition for the term “dis-
charge.” 
That the first two provisions contain an intent requirement while 
the third does not may yield dual interpretations: either (1) that 
Congress, by omitting an intent requirement for the third provision, 
intended to distinguish it from the others as not requiring mens 
rea;228 or alternatively, (2) that the intent requirement in the first two 
provisions creates a pattern of requiring mens rea, which naturally 
progresses to the third.229  The answer might lie in Congress’s use of 
definitions.  Congress included the definition of “brandish” to ensure 
that the use of a firearm to threaten another, even though it might 
not be visible, would still trigger § 924(c)’s brandishing provision.230  
Otherwise, courts would apply the plain and ordinary meaning of 
“brandish” and likely exclude non-visible, though threatening, uses of 
a firearm.  Congress did not define “brandish” in the statute for the 
purpose of creating an explicit intent requirement.  If it had then 
Congress would seem to have purposely omitted an explicit intent 
requirement for the discharge provision.  Therefore, since Congress 
defined “brandish” in the statute specifically to address the use of 
concealed firearms—not to include an intent requirement—then the 
argument that Congress purposely left the term “discharge” without 
an intent requirement is weakened. 
Furthermore, why include express requirements of intent for 
one term but not the other?  According to its plain and ordinary 
meaning, to brandish an object is an inherently intentional action,231 
and Congress’s use of intent-based language, such as “in order to in-
timidate,”232 added no extraordinary meaning to the term.  This may 
indicate that Congress did not purposely draft an intent requirement 
into one term and omit it in another.  Rather, Congress drafted the 
statute to define “brandish” ordinarily, albeit to also include hidden-
brandishing, and left “discharge” alone.  Again, this argues against 
745, 749 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Davis, 240 F. Supp. 2d 322, 324–25 
(E.D.P.A. 2003); see also United States v. Cain, 440 F.3d 672, 677 n.5 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(emphasizing that the “statute itself defines ‘brandish’ to include the display of a 
firearm ‘in order to intimidate [a] person.’”).  But see Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d at 1205–06. 
 228 Brown, 449 F.3d at 157–58 (explaining the government’s arguments). 
 229 Id. at 156 (settling on this interpretation). 
 230 Id. at 157; see also supra notes 158–62 and accompanying text. 
 231 See Brown, 449 F.3d at 157.  Dictionary definitions of “brandish” include “[t]o 
wave or flourish threateningly, as a weapon,” and “[t]to shake or wave (a weapon) 
menacingly [or] to exhibit or expose in an ostentatious, shameless, or aggressive 
manner.” WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 89 (1984); THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 268 (1981). 
 232 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4) (2006). 
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viewing the discharge provision’s lack of expressly stated intent as a 
third outlier.  If both interpretations seem equally plausible, however, 
ambiguity invites the use of lenity and the presumption against strict 
liability. 
An examination of the statute’s congressional record reveals that 
the comments made by legislators regarding the increased sentence 
under the discharge provision overwhelmingly used the verb “dis-
charge” in its active form with the defendant as the subject.233  For in-
stance, Representative McCollum, then Chairman of the Subcom-
mitee on Crime, made the following statements: 
And unless we make it the law of the land that criminal gun use 
will put you in prison for a long, long time, we and all of our 
loved ones will continue to remain in grave danger any time some 
young thug decides to pull the trigger. . . . By golly, if they pull the trig-
ger under this bill, they should get an additional 20-year manda-
tory sentence. . . . We have brandishing, which is pointing the 
gun, which gets 15, and pulling the trigger, which gets 20.234
Similar statements were made by Representative Buyer: “if a thug dis-
charges the firearm, then the mandatory minimum is 20 years”;235 and 
Representative Cunningham: “[i]f he discharges that weapon, count on 
20 years in jail.”236  The House Subcommittee report indicated that 
the statute imposes an additional sentence “[i]f the person discharges 
the firearm.”237
The predominant use of “discharge” in its active form strength-
ens the argument that Congress intended for § 924(c)’s sentence en-
hancement to apply only to a defendant who personally committed 
the act of discharging the weapon.  For instance, the numerous 
comments made that “pulling the trigger” results in an increased sen-
tence238 seems to foreclose the concern that a defendant should be 
sentenced under the discharge provision if a third party grabbed the 
gun and shot it or if the defendant dropped the gun to comply with a 
 233 See 144 CONG. REC. H530 passim (1998).  But see 144 CONG. REC. H530, H531 
(statement of Rep. McCollum) (stating that “discharging will lead to a mandatory 20 
years”); id. (stating that “the enhancement provisions for the crime, requires that . . . 
the discharging of the gun be committed”); id. at H535 (statement of Rep. Crane) 
(“If a gun is discharged during the crime, he will receive a 20 year prison term.”). 
 234 144 CONG. REC. H530, H531, H534 (1989) (statement of Rep. McCollum) 
(emphasis added).  Note that the original House bill would have increased the man-
datory minimum sentence to twenty years under § 924(c)’s discharge provision. 
 235 Id. at H533 (statement of Rep. Buyer). 
 236 Id. at H535 (statement of Rep. Cunningham). 
 237 H.R. REP. NO. 105-344, at 3 (1997). 
 238 Id. at 2–16. 
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police order and the gun accidentally discharged.239  Yet, just because 
the legislators intended for the discharge provision to apply only to 
the defendant who personally commits the act does not necessarily 
mean they required that the defendant be mentally culpable for the 
act.  Still, comments such as those made by Representative McCollum 
that the statute protects the public from thugs who “decide to pull 
the trigger”240 supports the position that the discharge enhancement 
applies only to defendants who, in exercising their free will, decided 
and intended to discharge the firearm. 
Until the 1998 amendments, a defendant who discharged a fire-
arm during the commission of a crime would have been sentenced 
under § 924(c)’s underlying offense for “using or carrying” a firearm 
during a crime.241  Even though the statute contained no express in-
tent requirement, jury charges under § 924(c)’s “uses or carries” pro-
vision required the jury to find that the defendant knowingly or in-
tentionally “used or carried” a firearm.242  When Congress amended 
the statute, “[i]t replace[d] the ‘uses or carries’ test with increased 
penalties for any person who ‘possesses,’ ‘brandishes,’ or ‘discharges’ 
a firearm.”243  Again, Congress omitted an express intent requirement 
for discharging the firearm and made no mention of the required in-
tent during Congressional deliberations or in Committee Reports.   
VII. CONCLUSION 
The federal courts should disregard the Tenth Circuit’s rule that 
sentencing factors do not require a finding of mens rea.  Courts 
should require proof that that a defendant intended to discharge a 
firearm under § 924(c).  The Tenth Circuit rule that sentencing fac-
tors do not require a finding of mens rea has little legal support and 
rests on a shaky Supreme Court decision.  Other circuit courts, in-
cluding those relied on by the court in Nava-Sotelo, have required a 
finding of criminal intent during the sentencing phase.  Moreover, 
considering the Supreme Court’s recent push toward enhancing the 
procedural protections afforded to a defendant during sentencing, 
such a rule would likely fail under the Court’s scrutiny.  A traditional 
analysis of congressional intent underlying § 924(c)’s discharge pro-
vision reveals little regarding the statute’s culpability requirements; 
 239 United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 154, 157 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 240 144 CONG. REC. H531 (statement of Rep. McCollum). 
 241 Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 148 (1995). 
 242 See United States v. Malpeso, 115 F.3d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 243 H.R. REP. NO. 105-344 (1997). 
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therefore, a court should be more willing to utilize the rule of lenity 
and the presumption against strict liability. 
Finally, the opposition to mandatory minimum statutes as a 
whole may argue for requiring an intent determination.  According 
to at least one commentator, the decreased procedural protections 
that a defendant receives during sentencing increases the importance 
of ensuring that the defendant is culpable.244  By ruling that the dis-
charge provision is a sentencing factor, the Supreme Court in Harris 
has already minimized the procedural rights afforded to the accused.  
Thus, by mandating an increased sentence of three years for acciden-
tally discharging a firearm, the statute may impose excessive punish-
ment, which could otherwise be mitigated if judges were allowed dis-
cretion.245  Since judges are not allowed discretion to individualize 
sentences under mandatory minimum statutes, a movement toward 
imputing mens rea during the sentencing stage when these statutes 
are ambiguous may be a reasonable method to prevent unjust results. 
 244 Jack B. Weinstein & Fred A. Bernstein, The Denigration of Mens Rea in Drug Sen-
tencing, 7 FED. SENT’G. REP. 121, 123 (1994). 
 245 See United States v. Hungerford, No. 05-30500, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 25529, at 
*1118–23 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 2006) (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
